outlining the hitherto accepted 'Bolam' standard, in his recent speech in the House ofLords decision of Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital, reflecting earlierjudicial dicta suggesting that it is for the medical profession rather than the courts to determine whether or not a medicalpractitioner has achieved the required standard ofcare (1) . It is suggested here that this concept is bad in principle, and that the weight ofjudicial authority is against it.
Medical negligence, like all other areas ofnegligence, is concerned with the determination of whether the defendant came up to the standard of care he owes to the plaintiff: whether the doctor achieved the standard of care he owes to the patient. The 'duty of care' is a duty demanded by the law to achieve a certain standard, and in the 'normal' (ie non-medical) case It is respectfully suggested that the above interpretations of the test for the standard of care in Hunter and in Bolam are not accurate, and that the situation in law is that while the courts will have regard to common practice in determining the issue of negligence, they will not be bound to accept that evidence in all cases as conclusive.
The issue of common practice is one which has been considered in numerous cases of negligence not involving doctors. In the leading case of Cavanagh v Ulster Weaving Co Ltd (10) the House of Lords held employers liable for not taking proper care of their employees, even although their safety precautions were shown by unchallenged evidence to be those commonly adopted in like circumstances. Though they had followed common practice, the employers were nevertheless negligent in law. The law demanded of these defendants that they go beyond common practice. There is no There are indeed strong policy grounds for denying that the law decrees in all cases that a doctor should follow common practice in like circumstances. Every medical advance since Hippocrates has at some stage been a departure from the normal and accepted practice, and to castigate such departure as ofits nature negligence is a dangerous nonsense. As Lord Clyde cogently points out in Hunter v Hanley 'it would be disastrous if this were so, for all inducement to progress in medical science would then be destroyed. Even a substantial deviation from normal practice may be warranted by the particular circumstances'. It is therefore submitted that the court may be influenced but will not be bound by evidence of accepted medical practice.
Though contrary to what Lord Alness said in
ordinary' medical negligence case to mean that doctors may set their own standard, which the courts are bound to accept, (and then held that test inapplicable to 'informed consent' cases), he was in a minority of one with this approach. Sidaway concerned the alleged failure to disclose information of risks, and the majority held, first, that this type of negligence was subject to the identical standard in law as any other action for medical negligence; and secondly that the Bolam test, applicable to both, was not as Lord Scarman interpreted it. Rather, they held that it was for the court always to set the standard of care demanded by the law, and that this is implicit in the Bolam test itself. Lord Bridge refused to accept that the Bolam test 'involves the necessity to "hand over to the medical profession the entire question of the scope of the duty of disclosure including the question whether there has been a breach of that duty" . . . (E)ven in a case where, as here, no expert witness in the relevant medical field condemns the non-disclosure as being in conflict with accepted and responsible medical practice, I am ofopinion that the judge might in certain circumstances come to the conclusion that disclosure of a particular risk was so obviously necessary to an informed choice on the part of the patient that no reasonably prudent medical man would fail to make it.' And Lord Templeman in the same case, though accepting that the court will be slow to conclude that a doctor following the disclosure practices of the medical profession has been negligent, emphasises in the end that 'it is for the court to decide, after hearing the doctor's explanation, whether the doctor has in fact been guilty of a breach of duty with regard to information'. That the court has the power to hold an almost universally accepted medical practice to be legally unacceptable should be clear from the Court of Appeal's holding in Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority ( 11) that the provision of contraceptives to girls under 16 is unlawful.
From these recent decisions it must now be clear that it is a misinterpretation of the law of professional negligence to claim that a doctor need only come up to the standards ofhis peers to be legally unchallengeable. This is not the case. Rather, a doctor, like any other person, must come up to the standard demanded by the law. That standard is one of 'reasonable care', and a doctor is not necessarily acting reasonably (in law) simply by acting as other doctors would. Doctors must be aware that it is nothing short of dangerous complacency to assume that they are safe from legal criticism if they do only as their neighbours do. A doctor is free from legal criticism only if he acts reasonably, a word which, though vague, does allow the court to take into account all the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case. And surely this reflects medical practice in general, which is aimed to treat particular patients according to their own particular needs and circumstances rather than simply providing treatment of the sort that is normally given to that type of patient. Medical treatment is not determined by plebiscite: neither is its legal acceptability. Kenneth McK Norrie is a Lecturer in Law at Aberdeen University, Taylor Building, Old Aberdeen, AB9 2UB.
